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Act and the Higgs report.  Where Enron’s board failed was in underestimating 
the risks that were inherent in the company’s business plan and failing to 
implement an effective system of internal control.  Enron demonstrates the 
limits of the monitoring board and points the way to a stewardship model in 
which the board takes responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of the 
company’s assets over time. 
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1.  Introduction:  Enron as corporate governance failure 
 
Financial scandals have long been one of the main drivers of change in 
company law (Lee, 2002). In the case of Enron, the response of lawmakers to 
the company’s collapse in the final months of 2001 was immediate and 
far-reaching. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adopted by the US Congress in the 
summer of 2002, is the most significant measure of federal securities and 
corporate law since the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. In many respects, 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a mirror image of Enron:  the company’s perceived corporate 
governance failings are matched virtually point for point in the principal 
provisions of the Act (see Ribstein, 2003). The guiding assumption of the new 
law is that Enron’s fall was brought about by conflicts of interest on the part of 
its senior managers and by a lack of oversight on the part of its board and 
advisers. As a result, the Act imposes rules aimed at enhancing the 
independence of directors and auditors, with the objective of more precisely 
aligning managerial behaviour with the interests of shareholders. The same 
objective underlies UK responses to the corporate scandals, including the 
recommendations made in the Higgs Review of Non-Executive Directors 
(Higgs, 2003) for changes to the Combined Code. Higgs and Sarbanes-Oxley, 
then, are entirely consistent with the idea that, above all others, informed late 
twentieth century capitalism in the common law world, namely that 
corporations exist to further the interests of their shareholders. 
 
In this paper we take a closer look at the events surrounding Enron’s fall with a 
view to assessing whether the response that it has elicited is justified. We argue 
that, while there were serious conflicts of interest at the board and senior 
management levels in the period running up to the company’s bankruptcy, these 
conflicts were not the principal reason for its fall. More relevant, from a 
corporate governance point of view, was the failure of Enron’s board and 
management to take responsibility for the risks inherent in the company’s 
business plan, in particular the use of special purpose entities (SPEs) and related 
forms of so-called ‘structured finance’. It was the misuse of these forms of 
off-balance sheet financing and the need to correct their initial mis-reporting in 
the company’s accounts which destroyed market confidence in Enron; the 
conflicts of interest which led to the enrichment of certain corporate officers, 
while egregious, were incidental to the company’s failure.   
 
The circumstances of Enron’s fall should be seen in a wider context. As its 
fortunes rose, in particular during the second half of the 1990s, Enron was 
celebrated in the financial press and in business school case studies because it 
was seen to embody an agenda for the modernization of the corporation.  
Enron’s managers understood and applied the language of ‘core competencies’, 
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‘asset lite’ balance sheets and ‘virtual integration’. Enron was also, famously, 
the company that claimed above all others to be ‘laser focused on earnings per 
share’. Its fall inevitably resonates, then, with widely expressed concerns about 
the effects of the dominance of the ‘shareholder value’ norm in 
Anglo-American corporate governance (Kennedy, 2000; Mitchell, 2001; 
Bratton, 2002; Millon, 2003). Yet this aspect of the debate is almost entirely 
missing from the public policy discourse surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Higgs. Is it possible that policy-makers are learning the wrong lesson from 
Enron? 
 
 
2.  Virtual integration and ‘asset lite’:  Enron’s business plan 
 
The business strategy, which Enron’s managers developed in the course of the 
1990s, was based on the exploitation of novel forms of risk management in the 
energy supply chain. Enron began life from the merger of two utility companies 
in the mid-1980s and, for the next ten years, enjoyed steadily rising profitability 
as it exploited the opportunities that arose from the deregulation of US energy 
markets (Fusaro and Miller, 2002). In addition to owning several interstate gas 
pipelines, Enron ran a natural gas and electricity transmission business and a 
retail supply arm dealing directly with energy users. When, after 1985, access to 
gas pipelines was deregulated, Enron developed a gas trading business offering 
various types of derivatives (forward contracts and options) to its customers.   
 
The emergence of futures markets for gas supply created the possibility of  
‘spread’ or ‘basis trading’ which exploited the difference between prices in spot 
markets and futures markets. Enron’s head start in gas trading enabled it to act 
as a market maker for parties on either side of the supply chain; it would 
therefore act as a counterparty to trades on both sides of the exchange, in effect 
taking its profits in the form of the spread between bid prices and offer prices.  
By acting for both sides, Enron confined its exposure to the residual risk across 
the market as a whole, which it was then able to hedge by entering into swaps 
and similar arrangements with dealers on recognised futures exchanges.   
 
As an energy trader, Enron had a comparative advantage over its rivals from the 
financial sector: because it owned and operated physical plant, it was in a 
position to hold energy supplies in its own right as a protection against 
movements in market prices. As an industry insider it also had an informational 
advantage in forecasting regional and sectoral shocks. As a result, it could claim 
to be both a ‘market maker’ (in the sense of supplying liquidity to an existing 
market) and a ‘creator’ of altogether new types of products, using legal and 
contractual ‘technologies’ to develop and trade mechanisms of risk management 
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which had not previously existed. As Jeffrey Skilling, initially the head of 
Enron’s energy trading business and later (briefly) its CEO put it, ‘[we are] a 
company that makes markets. We create the market, and once it’s created, we 
make the market’ (quoted in Culp and Hanke, 2003: 7). 
 
Enron’s business strategy was, as it put it, ‘asset lite’ [sic] in the sense that it 
sought to combine the minimum level of ownership and operation of plant, 
which was necessary to maintain a physical market presence, with the 
development of ever more sophisticated risk management techniques. Enron 
was heavily leveraged for much of the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the loans 
initially taken on at the time of the merger, which created the company.  
‘Heavy’ assets such as pipelines, power stations and reservoirs represented 
fixed costs and a potential drain on the company’s profitability and its capacity 
to manage debt. Trading derivatives contracts, on the other hand, did not (in 
theory, at least) involve such a high degree of fixed capital investments.  Thus 
the optimal combination was one in which a relatively small investment in 
physical assets was combined with an extensive market-making ‘overlay’.  The 
‘asset lite’ approach implied that, by these means, a higher rate of return could 
be achieved than through a more traditional asset structure.  This meant, in turn, 
moving from a ‘vertically integrated’ form of organization to one in which 
different firms in the supply chain were linked through ‘virtual integration’ 
based on the contractual management of risks: 
 
‘The fundamental advantage of a virtually integrated system is you 
need less capital to provide the same reliability…It’s very hard to 
earn a compensatory rate of return on a traditional asset 
investment… In today’s world, you have to bring intellectual 
content to the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return …’ 
(Skilling in BusinessWeek Online February 2001, quoted in 
Bratton, 2002: 1292). 
 
There is an argument for saying that energy derivatives provided markets with 
much needed liquidity in the period following liberalization (see Culp and 
Hanke, 2003: 6). However, this must be set against allegations that the company 
was involved in attempts to manipulate energy prices in a number of states 
including California, and claims that, from early on in the existence of its 
energy trading arm, the company’s earnings from derivatives were being 
mis-stated in ways which concealed its true position (for discussion, see 
Partnoy, 2003: ch. 10). Until such time as evidence from Enron’s bankruptcy 
proceedings or elsewhere may show otherwise, it seems reasonable to accept 
that Enron’s energy trading business was both legitimate and useful.  But even 
on this basis, there were considerable risks for the company.   
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An ‘asset lite’ strategy requires a number of preconditions to be met if it is to be 
successful (Culp and Hanke, 2003: 15): 
 
1. the company must have access to considerable resources of liquid capital 
if it is to be able to service its obligations as a counterparty to transactions 
in which it simultaneously services both buyers and sellers in the chain of 
supply; 
 
2. relatedly, it must enjoy an unblemished reputation with the banks and 
credit rating agencies on which it ultimately depends for its supply of 
liquid capital; and  
 
3. in order to maintain its comparative informational advantage as a market 
maker, it needs to maintain a physical presence in the sectors in which it 
operates as a trader.  
 
The architects of Enron’s strategy were well aware that being able to meet these 
conditions was the basis for the company’s competitive position: 
 
‘In Volatile Markets, Everything Changes but Us. When customers do 
business with Enron, they get our commitment to reliably deliver their 
product at a predictable price, regardless of market condition. This 
commitment is possible because of Enron’s unrivalled access to 
markets and liquidity … Market access and information allow Enron 
to deliver comprehensive logistical solutions that work in volatile 
markets or markets undergoing fundamental changes, such as energy 
and broadband’ (Enron Annual Report, 2000, quoted in Bratton, 2002: 
1291) 
 
Enron’s bankruptcy came about in the autumn of 2001 when each of these 
conditions, in turn, ceased to hold. In part this can be attributed to its decision to 
start offering derivatives contracts in markets, such as broadband, which were 
not only highly volatile, but in which it had no physical presence and no 
specialized knowledge of the kind which would give it a comparative 
advantage. But the disappearance of its working credit and the collapse of 
support from lenders around this time were also linked to the unraveling of 
accounting devices which it had used to shift heavy and/or volatile assets off its 
balance sheet.  This was the less acceptable side of ‘asset lite’.   
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3.  Enron’s accounting:  ‘intelligent gambling’ 
 
Enron took advantage of US accounting rules, which enable companies to set up 
corporate vehicles, so-called special purpose entities or SPEs, to manage assets 
off balance sheet.  In essence, these rules allow companies to engage in a form 
of risk-spreading. The return on an asset can be maximized, and risk minimized, 
by transferring it to an SPE, which must at some point repay the debt that it has 
incurred to the vendor company. An outside investor comes in to supply 
external capital and share the risk with the vendor, in exchange for which it also 
gets to share in the high rate of return that the SPE can provide. 
 
It is a basic principle of modern company law and accounting practice that the 
accounts of parent and subsidiary companies in the same group should be 
consolidated. Otherwise, it is a fairly simple matter to shift assets between 
parent and subsidiary in such a way as to give a misleading impression to 
shareholders of the state of their respective balance sheets. This principle has 
been recognized for over half a century in developed economies and was 
introduced as a response to some of the more egregious accounting scandals that 
accompanied the Great Crash of 1929 and the economic depression of the 1930s 
(for the UK side of this story, see Lee, 2002).   
 
The rules on SPEs give every appearance of marking a fundamental departure 
from the principle of consolidation. The US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US GAAP) provide that the assets and liabilities of an SPE do not 
need to appear on the balance sheet of the vendor company which has set it up, 
as long as two conditions are satisfied:  the outside investor must supply at least 
3% of the total working capital of the SPE and, in addition, must be in a 
position to control the disposition of the asset or assets which are transferred to 
the SPE. The 3% figure was introduced by the SEC in 1991. It was meant to 
represent the minimum acceptable investment that was compatible with the 
notion of a genuine transfer of risk of the kind that would occur in the leasing 
transactions, which at that time represented the most common situation in which 
SPEs were used. Moreover, the original letter issued by the SEC presented the 
3% figure as indicative only:  it was thought that ‘a greater investment may be 
necessary depending on the facts and circumstances, including the credit risk 
associated with the lessee and the market risk factors associated with the leased 
property’ (Partnoy, 2003: 81). However, in the course of the 1990s, meeting the 
3% threshold came to be seen as sufficient in itself for complying with US 
GAAP; today, structured finance transactions using SPEs have a combined 
annual value of trillions of dollars. 
 
  6
In the course of the 1990s Enron set up several thousand companies which, 
thanks to the rules of US GAAP on SPEs and so-called ‘equity accounting’, did 
not count as its subsidiaries and whose accounts therefore did not need to be 
consolidated with its own. The use of SPEs and equity affiliates enabled Enron 
to replace potential liabilities (risky or heavy investments with the potential to 
be a drain on the company) with assets (promissory notes issued to Enron by its 
own SPEs) and earnings (income streams generated as the SPEs repaid to Enron 
the debts incurred as a result of the initial asset transfer).   
 
None of this was a problem in practice, and none of it contravened accounting 
principles or the rules of corporate law, until the late 1990s when the company 
entered into a series of transactions for which no genuine outside investor could 
be found. In the case of the SPE known as Chewco, the ‘investment’ was made 
in the form of a bank loan, which Enron guaranteed.  Attempts were made to 
dress up the loan as an equity holding but, in essence, the bank in question was 
not putting up any risk capital and so the deal was a sham. Further sets of 
entities, the LJM and Raptor SPEs, were capitalized through a combination of 
bank loans and Enron common stock. These SPEs were used to take on 
extremely volatile investments, including shares in a dotcom company (the 
‘Rhythms transaction’), which Enron had booked as assets on its balance sheet 
using ‘mark to market accounting’. If these assets were to have declined in 
value, Enron faced a potential loss on its balance sheet.  This in turn represented 
a risk to its credit rating. 
 
The existence of these transactions was disclosed, as required, in Enron’s 
annual reports, but in a manner which was less than clear and did not avert to 
the essentially sham nature of the deals. The further details which are now 
available were first revealed in the Powers report, a several hundred page 
document produced by a subcommittee of Enron’s own board in the weeks 
following the company’s bankruptcy. Additional material emerged in several 
weeks of hearings before Congress and through the publication of a Senate 
subcommittee report in July 2002 that provided a blow by blow account of 
alleged failings of Enron’s board (Senate subcommittee, 2002). As bankruptcy 
proceedings began in New York in the winter of 2002, the court placed several 
thousand pages of documents relating to the company’s collapse on a website 
with public access. The extent of disclosure and its focus on what the board 
knew contrast sharply with the much more limited inquiry carried out by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2003) into the near collapse of the leading 
UK engineering and telecoms company, Marconi, in 2002; we still know little 
about the circumstances under which the decisions that led to Marconi’s 
difficulties were reported to and approved by its board (see Plender, 2003: ch. 5, 
for one of the few informed accounts). 
  7
As the Powers report put it (Powers, 2002: 98), ‘the Raptors were designed to 
make use of forecasted future growth of Enron’s stock price to shield Enron’s 
income statement from reflecting future losses incurred on merchant 
investments’ such as the Rhythms shares. However, ‘[t]his strategy of using 
Enron’s own stock to offset losses runs counter to a basic principle of 
accounting and financial reporting: except under limited circumstances, a 
business may not recognize gains due to the increase in the value of its capital 
stock on its income statement’ (Powers, 2002: 98).  Put slightly differently, a 
company should not be able to present an increase in its share price as 
additional earnings simply with the aim of generating a further increase in that 
same share price. However, this was precisely what Enron did in the case of the 
Raptors, and had been doing for several years; as long ago as 1996, its CFO, 
Andrew Fastow, had made a virtue of the practice (see Partnoy, 2003: 303). 
 
Enron’s share price, at this point in the late 1990s, was enjoying enormous 
growth, in large part because of a perception that it was a ‘new economy’ 
company. Capitalizing the LJM and Raptor SPEs with Enron shares must 
therefore have seemed a low-risk option. Clearly, it was only low risk as long as 
the share price continued to rise as it had done for the previous decade. Like all 
other ‘new economy’ companies, Enron’s shares began to fall from early 2000 
as the result of the bursting of the dotcom bubble. There was little or nothing 
Enron could do about this. But as the share price steadily declined through the 
spring and summer of 2001, it looked increasingly likely that the LJM and 
Raptor SPEs would default on their obligations to Enron.  To make things even 
worse, no attempt had been made to take out a separate ‘hedge’ on the deals in 
question by transacting for a third party to take the risk of default. Essentially 
this was because the assets concerned (the Rhythms stock and similar financial 
investments) were simply too ‘large and illiquid’ (in effect, too risk-prone) to be 
hedged in the normal way (Powers, 2002: 100). 
 
Enron’s fall was probably unavoidable once the sham SPE transactions began to 
unravel in the autumn of 2001. Chewco was the first SPE to be wound up and 
the LJM and Raptor transactions then followed.  In each case Enron’s auditor, 
Arthur Andersen, having initially approved the deals, now told the company 
that they were incompatible with accounting principles. In each case, the 
balance sheets of the SPEs had to be consolidated with that of the parent 
company. The result was that earnings going back several years had to be 
restated and liabilities that had previously been concealed in the SPEs had to be 
reported on Enron’s balance sheet. The earnings restatements ran into several 
hundred million dollars and the revaluation of assets and liabilities led to an 
overall reduction in the company’s worth of several billion dollars. 
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These restatements and revaluations would not in themselves have bankrupted 
Enron. Its annual revenues (in the sense of cash flow) at this point were in the 
tens of billions of dollars and while its pre-tax earnings (in the sense of profits) 
were much less than this (around $1.5 billion in the five quarters to the autumn 
of 2001), even with the Raptor restatements, it would not have ended up 
reporting a loss. However, the events of autumn 2001 shook market confidence, 
which had already been undermined by Skilling’s unexplained resignation as 
CEO in August of that year. At the end of October 2001 Moody’s Investor 
Services downgraded Enron’s long-term debt, in direct response to the 
announcement of earnings restatements. Other credit rating agencies followed 
their example. As Enron’s credit status declined (eventually falling below 
investment grade level), debts automatically fell due and liabilities accumulated 
under the terms of its loan covenants. The effect, as Skilling later put it, was like 
that of a ‘run on the bank’. This was more than just the result of ‘a simple flaw 
in treasury management’ (Plender, 2003: 175); Enron’s entire strategy depended 
upon being able to maintain the confidence of the credit and capital markets.  
Efforts to save the company through a last-minute line of credit from the 
investment bank J.P. Morgan, and a planned merger with rival energy trader 
Dynegy (which was called off as the scale of Enron’s debts became clear) failed 
in November 2001. As a result, the company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy on 
2 December. Its shares, which had once traded at over $90, then stood at less 
than $1 each. 
 
 
4. Conflicts of interest, risk management and the role of the board 
 
The role of the conflicts of interest that have since been the focus of much 
attention and debate must be seen against the backdrop of the company’s final 
months. The most serious of the conflicts related to the involvement of Enron 
corporate officers in setting up and running some of the sham SPEs with which 
the company dealt. Michael Kopper, a senior employee in the finance section of 
the company, ran the Chewco SPE through a series of limited partnerships and 
companies that he controlled; his involvement was not disclosed to the board.  
Fastow ran the LJM SPEs and was prominently involved in several of the 
entities used as part of the Raptor transactions, as were a number of more junior 
Enron employees in accounting and finance positions. Fastow’s involvement in 
the LJM deals was not only disclosed to the board, at a meeting which took 
place in 1999, but the board approved of his participation, following a 
recommendation to this effect from the then CEO and Chairman, Ken Lay. 
 
Fastow and Kopper were not members of Enron’s board. However, as senior 
employees and, in Fastow’s case, a designated senior officer of the company, 
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they owed fiduciary duties to Enron. Self-dealing – acting on both sides of the 
deal – is potentially a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that a director or 
senior employee owes to the company. However, fiduciary duty laws can, in 
effect, be waived. In the context of a listed company such as Enron, approval by 
the board will almost certainly suffice. With a dispersed shareholder base it is 
impracticable to require shareholder approval in such a case, and corporate law 
generally does not insist upon it. Fastow’s involvement was, however, disclosed 
to shareholders in Enron’s annual report for 2000, after the transactions were 
undertaken but well before the company’s difficulties began. While his role in 
the LJM deal would have been a breach of Enron’s own code of ethics had the 
board not waived it on Lay’s advice, the code was not legally binding and the 
board did, in this event, give its approval.   
 
The Powers Report implies that the board was either misled, or simply not 
informed, about Kopper’s role in Chewco. It also indicates that the board was 
not informed of the large sums which Fastow, Kopper and others received for 
managing the SPEs that they set up. Fastow received $30 million in return for 
his part in this. It was only in October 2001, when the deals were falling apart, 
that the board asked and learned about the extent of Fastow’s remuneration. 
Following this, it decided to suspend him from his employment with Enron. It is 
far from clear that Fastow committed any legal wrong in not notifying the board 
since the sums in question were not received in his capacity as Enron’s CFO. It 
is, however, difficult to explain why the board made no earlier inquiry on the 
matter. 
 
The report of the Senate subcommittee was much more critical of Enron’s board 
than the Powers report had been. The subcommittee accused board members of 
allowing own conflicts of interest to get in the way of their monitoring role. In 
particular, it argued that nearly all of the non-executive directors were 
conflicted because they received substantial payments as consultants in addition 
to their directors’ fees. In addition, some members of the board received indirect 
compensation in the form of gifts made by Enron to their universities and 
hospitals. Part of the reaction to Enron since its fall has been to regard such 
connections with suspicion. As we noted above, both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the US and the Higgs Review of Non-Executive Directors in the UK went out of 
their way to stress the need for genuine independence on the part of 
non-executives.   
 
In the same vein, Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron’s auditors, has been blamed for 
failing to act with the necessary independence in its dealings with Enron.  
Andersen received fees not just for auditing, but also for consultancy services; 
and it engaged in regular exchanges of employees with Enron. It earned 
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substantial fees, tens of millions of dollars, from organizing the SPE 
transactions, which were to prove most costly to the company.  Enron’s legal 
advisers, Vinson and Elkins, were also directly involved in arranging these 
transactions. The view that Enron and other corporate scandals owed much to 
the decline in the professional standards of the legal and accounting 
‘gatekeepers’ during the 1990s (Coffee, 2002) is behind several of the new 
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, such as those relating to the regular rotation of 
accounting partners responsible for auditing company accounts. 
 
How should we assess the charge that conflicts of interest brought Enron down?  
Three different sets of conflicts need to be considered, namely those affecting 
senior managers, the auditors, and the non-executive directors. The main charge 
against the senior managers relates to the self-dealing and stratospheric 
remuneration that accompanied the setting up of the sham SPEs. However, 
while the sums paid to Fastow and his immediate colleagues for running the 
SPEs were enormous even by the standards of late 1990s corporate America, 
the sums diverted did not bankrupt Enron. The real damage was indirect; when 
the deals set up by Fastow were unraveled, investor and creditor confidence in 
the company was undermined at a critical time. From this perspective (and with 
the obvious benefit of hindsight), it could be said that the board made a mistake 
in waiving the ethics code. However, the earnings restatements that upset the 
markets were brought about not by Fastow’s conflicts of interest but by the 
quite separate issue of the earnings restatements that followed Andersen’s 
belated decision that the relevant transactions did not comply with US GAAP.   
 
It must also be remembered that much of the news that hurt Enron in 2001 did 
not involve any breach at all of the ‘no conflicts’ rule. Members of Enron’s 
senior management team had each profited by tens (sometimes hundreds) of 
millions of dollars from cashing in share options at a time when the company’s 
share price was falling and its future looked uncertain. The sums raised by these 
means dwarf even Fastow’s $30 million. When the sales were revealed in the 
autumn of 2001 there was an outcry and allegations of illegal insider dealing 
were made, but these have yet to be borne out. On one view, Enron executives 
were simply doing what many managers in new economy companies did in the 
late 1990s: they cashed in share options in a falling market before it was too 
late. 
 
There is also substantial evidence to cast doubt upon the claim that Andersen 
was prevented from acting by its own conflicts of interest. We know from the 
report of the Senate Sub-Committee that in 1999, Andersen told Enron’s audit 
committee that the company’s accounting practices were ‘at the edge’ of 
acceptable practice (Senate subcommittee, 2002: 12). In internal 
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communications during 2000, Andersen partners characterized Enron as a 
‘maximum risk’ client. Its managers were said to be ‘very sophisticated and 
enter into numerous complex transactions and are often aggressive in 
structuring transactions to deal with derived financial reporting objectives’. An 
Andersen lawyer said that it was ‘ridiculous’ to characterize Enron’s accounting 
practices as ‘mainstream’ (Senate Subcommittee, 2002: 17-19). Whatever the 
extent of Andersen’s involvement in, and encouragement of, Enron’s 
accounting strategy, it seems that Andersen regarded Enron as an atypical client 
with the potential to cause harm to the audit firm itself, as proved to be the case. 
 
Nor is it convincing to see the failure of Enron’s board as stemming from 
conflicts of interest on the part of the non-executive directors. Reputationally, 
the directors had much more to lose from Enron’s fall than they could ever gain 
from consultancy payments and charitable donations. Once evidence of the 
company’s perilous position began to emerge in the autumn of 2001 they were 
highly active in attempting to resolve the situation, only to find that there was 
virtually nothing they could do by that stage. Since the bankruptcy, they have 
had to endure public obloquy and a Senate inquisition; and the possibility of 
personal liability for breach of the duty of care cannot be ruled out.   
 
The charge against the board is, or should be, a quite different one:  Enron’s 
directors failed to make an appropriate assessment of the risks to which the 
company was exposed. Enron was engaged in what an Andersen partner called 
‘intelligent gambling’ (Senate subcommittee, 2002: 19). The ‘asset lite’ strategy 
was a fundamentally precarious one, which depended for its success on a 
contingent combination of circumstances. Although it was preeminent in the 
energy trading market, Enron faced growing competition from new entrants.  
Margins in derivatives and options trading are notoriously tight; to be profitable, 
Enron had to generate considerable volumes of business. It was far from 
unsuccessful in this, hence its position as one of the largest US corporations in 
term of revenues. But earnings were only ever a relatively small proportion of 
the cash flows generated from the company’s trades. It also seems that those 
profits that were recorded may well have been massaged over a period of years 
by the use of SPEs (see Partnoy, 2003: 325-330).   
 
Moreover, the misuse of SPEs that triggered the company’s downfall were not 
isolated incidents. The use of off-balance sheet financing had been endemic 
within Enron for several years and was an integral part of a business strategy, 
which depended for its success on creating the illusion of earnings growth. The 
board, while not aware of the degree to which senior managers were enriching 
themselves, was informed not just about the SPE transactions which were later 
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to lead to the company’s downfall; as we have seen, it was also told by 
Andersen that they ‘pushed limits’ and were ‘at the edge’ of acceptability. 
 
In the course of Congressional hearings, and again in reply to the findings of the 
Senate subcommittee, Enron directors argued that they had been either misled 
or not informed by senior managers of the essentially sham nature of the SPE 
deals. Even if important facts were kept from the board, however, this argument 
for disclaiming responsibility sits uneasily with the board’s responsibility for 
internal control. One of the core principles of Anglo-American corporate 
governance is that (in the words of the UK Combined Code, para. D2) ‘the 
board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets’. If the board does not put in 
place the procedures by which it can obtain the information that it needs to 
make the necessary assessment of business risks, the failure to do so is, in the 
final analysis, its own. In the UK, the basic obligation in paragraph D2 has been 
amplified by the Turnbull report (ICAEW, 1999) and, in a significant move, one 
of the less remarked on provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, section 404, now 
requires an annual disclosure stating how the board has fulfilled its 
responsibility not simply for maintaining an effective internal control structure 
but also for evaluating its operation. 
 
Enron’s board was ultimately responsible not simply for the company’s high 
risk accounting policy but also for a human resources strategy which made it 
more likely than not that it would never receive the information it needed about 
the company’s accounting practices. In line with what passed (then and since) 
for conventional wisdom on the need to incentivise employees, Enron operated 
a version of ‘rank and yank’ under which a fifth of its employees was regularly 
demoted or dismissed on the basis of performance rankings drawn up by peers 
and superiors. Those who stayed the course were well rewarded with stock 
options and performance-based increments. Under these circumstances it is not 
surprising that the employees engaged by Andrew Fastow with the task of 
setting up the Chewco and Raptor SPEs appear to have made no protest about 
the conflicts of interest to which these transactions gave rise, nor to have 
complained of the risk they represented to the company’s well being. Nor is it a 
surprise that these particular employees were also extremely well rewarded for 
their roles in facilitating the relevant transactions. 
 
As it turned out, it is clear that in the absence of an effective channel of 
communication from the board to the wider organization of the company, both 
the company’s assets and the investments of its shareholders were being put on 
the line. Moreover, the outcome produced real victims. Those affected were not 
just the beneficiaries of the mainly public sector pension funds who had 
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invested heavily in Enron stock, but also the many employees of Enron itself 
who were even more exposed than the pension funds were to fluctuations in the 
company’s fortunes, thanks in part to a ‘pensions blackout’ which prevented 
them from moving their section 401(k) pension plans into alternative 
investments during the autumn of 2001. Appropriately enough for a would-be 
virtual corporation, it was these employee-shareholders who came to bear the 
residual risk of the company’s failure; few of them were sufficiently senior in 
the organization to have had stock option plans of the kind which senior 
managers were continuing to exercise at the same time as the pensions blackout 
was in force. The most severe consequences of the failure of internal control 
were felt by those who had neither voice nor exit available to them. 
 
 
5. Conclusion:  Enron and the limits of the monitoring board  
 
The Enron affair raises a number of fundamental issues concerning the current 
trajectory of Anglo-American capitalism, in particular the role of deregulation 
in destabilizing energy markets and financial markets. It calls into the question 
the conventional wisdom that firms can generate value by unbundling their 
component parts in favour of a ‘virtually integrated’ structure, and it points to 
the costs involved in the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for 
employees. Above all, it undermines some of the central nostrums of the 
corporate governance debate for the past decade.   
 
If anything good is to come out of Enron’s failure, it lies in the capacity of the 
regulatory system to draw the right lessons. Here, the omens are not promising.  
Enron’s fall has been widely seen in terms of the inability of its board to 
effectively monitor what its managers were doing, with conflicts of interest 
identified as the root cause of this failure. But while there may well have been 
fraud at Enron, and conflicts of interest, these were not the sole or even the 
principal reason for the company’s collapse. Instead, Enron appears to have 
been a case of mismanagement of corporate risk. Enron collapsed because of a 
systemic failure in which the company’s business plan and its accounting policy 
were implicated. The company’s managers pursued a strategy of minimizing its 
fixed costs with the aim of boosting its share price. In the end it was only a short 
step from being ‘asset lite’ to using SPEs to manipulate earnings and conceal 
debts. At the same time, the company’s human resource strategy militated 
against a culture of transparency and trust. Its employees were subjected to a 
ruthlessly administered system of performance appraisal, which led to 
demotions and firings for those with low rankings. Treating employees as a 
readily disposable asset in this way may have been entirely consistent with the 
goal of creating a ‘virtual corporation’, but it also served to increase the risk of a 
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catastrophic failure of information and accountability of the kind that ensued in 
the autumn of 2001. In this situation, it is likely that no amount of extra 
monitoring by the board of its senior managers would have made any 
difference.   
 
It has been said that Enron is ‘an embarrassment’ for the model of the 
monitoring board on which so much reliance has been placed by corporate 
governance reformers (Gordon, 2002: 1241). Sarbanes-Oxley and Higgs, in 
their different ways, aim to strengthen the model by insisting, among other 
things, on stronger guarantees of independence for non-executive directors. But 
if the argument put forward here is correct, this strategy is likely to be of limited 
value and perhaps even counter-productive. Whatever else their failings may 
have been, Enron’s non-executive directors were as well qualified as almost any 
group of outsiders could have been to judge the regulatory and business risks 
which arose from the company’s business. That they failed to do so is testimony 
to the complexity of the monitoring task. In a deregulated and liberalized market 
environment, the risks of competitive failure on the part of listed companies are 
greater than they have ever been. This places non-executives, in particular, in an 
unenviable position:  when companies fail, they will increasingly be held 
accountable, either through the harm done to reputations or in extreme cases 
through litigation; but, as outsiders, they will often lack the knowledge and 
experience to have made a difference to the outcome. 
 
The goal of making the task of non-executives a meaningful one is linked to the 
wider issue of how to define the objectives of corporate governance. In the end, 
Enron’s ‘laser focus’ on shareholder value helped neither its board nor, 
paradoxically, its shareholders. The idea that directors should be stewards of the 
company’s assets with a view to ensuring its sustainability over time rather than 
simply the representatives of the shareholders is still, perhaps, regarded as 
heterodox in corporate governance circles, such is the power of shareholder 
value. The true lesson of Enron is that until the power of the shareholder value 
norm is broken, effective reform of corporate governance will be on hold. 
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